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FILED ~N OFF'
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON C
STATE OF GEORGIA
GEORGIA INTERLOCAL RISK
MANAGEMENT AGENCY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

CITY OF SANDY SPRINGS,
Defendant.

N Y

JAN 2 1 20'5

DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY, GA

Civil Action No. 2014CV248848

co~

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
On January 7, 2015, Counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on
Defendant City of Sandy Springs Motion to Dismiss.l

Upon consideration of the argument of

the parties and the briefs submitted on the Motion, this Court finds as follows:
Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency ("GIRMA") filed this declaratory action
seeking a determination whether or not it was required to defend the City of Sandy Springs (the
"City")

in ongoing

"Flanigan's")

litigation

brought

by

adult

entertainment

involving constitutional and civil rights claims.

businesses

(collectively,

Flanigan's first sued the City in

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in 2006 challenging certain zoning
and licensing legislation

that affected their businesses.

with leave to renew ("Flanigan's /").

This case was dismissed by the Court

On October 5, 2009, Flanigan's filed a renewal

complaint, again alleging constitutional and civil rights violations ("Flanigan's IF'). GIRMA's
obligation to defend the City in Flanigan's II is at issue in this declaratory action.

Following the hearing, GIRMA filed its First Amendment to Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment. The City responded by filing its answer and its Motion to Dismiss GIRMA's First
Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint and the subsequent Motion to Dismiss are both
considered herein.
I
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The Original Complaint in Flanigan IS II did not seek monetary damages and the parties

do not dispute that GIRMA did not have an obligation to defend the suit. Regardless, GIRMA
issued a Reservation of Rights letter on December 9, 2009, stating that it would defend the City,
but notifying the City that the Coverage Agreement "may not provide coverage due to certain
exclusions," in particular, an exclusion for "any claim seeking equitable relief, redress or any
other claim seeking relief in any form other than money damages."

On March 10, 2010,

Flanigan's filed an Amended Complaint in Flanigan IS II which also did not seek monetary
damages.
On December 13,2011,

the City filed a nuisance suit against Flanigan's in Fulton County

Superior COUli, seeking to enjoin activities that it alleged violated the City's Code and Georgia
criminal statutes. On JUl1e 20, 2012, in response to this nuisance suit, Flanigan's again amended
its Complaint in Flanigan IS II. This Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Damages added allegations that the City's nuisance suit was filed in retaliation of
Flanigan's renewing its action in federal court and sought nominal and compensatory damages.
On February 1, 2013, GIRMA issued a second Notice of Reservation of Rights amending and
restating the earlier Notice of Reservation of Rights dated December 9, 2009. The Notice stated
that GIRMA would continue to provide a defense, but reserved GIRMA's right to deny coverage
and indemnity for any settlement or judgment, and reserved "the right to recover advanced
defense incurred by GIRMA from this date forward and/or indemnity costs from the City if it is
determined that GIRMA was not obligated to defend the claim." GIRMA requested the City's
acknowledgement and consent by signature. The City did not sign the acknowledgement.
Flanigan IS 11 is still pending before the U.S. District Court although some of Flanigan's
claims, including claims for damages arising from the allegedly retaliatory nuisance suit, were
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dismissed in an April 9, 2014

Order on Motion for Summary Judgment.

The parties have

indicated that an appeal of the summary judgment ruling is likely.
The applicable provisions of the Coverage Agreement between the City and GIRMA are
as follows:
GIRMA shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the Member
claiming money damages for an Occurrence or Wrongful Act during the
Coverage Agreement Period for which coverage is afforded under this
Agreement, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or
fraudulent, ... [Coverage Agreement at p. 11];

"Wrongful Act" includes actual or alleged violations of the United States
Constitution, or any State Constitution, or any law affording protection for Civil
Rights. [Coverage Agreement at p. 14];
GIRMA hereby agrees, subject to the definitions, exclusions, limitations, terms
and conditions herein mentioned to pay on behalf of the Named Member all
money damages incurred by the Named Member by reason of any Wrongful Act
committed during the Coverage Agreement Period. [Coverage Agreement at p.
36];
[A]ny claim arising out of or in any way connected with any claim seeking
equitable relief, redress or any other claim seeking relief in any form other than
money damages [is excluded from coverage]. [Coverage Agreement at p. 6].
See Compl., Ex. 1.
GIRMA seeks a declaration that money damages are not at issue in Flanigan's II and that
the policy exclusion for claims seeking "other than money damages" applies. Specifically, the
prayer for relief in GIRMA's Complaint seeks a determination that (a) the Flanigan's II claims
are not covered by the policy, (b) GIRMA is not obligated to pay for damages arising out of the
Flanigan's Illitigation, (c) GIRMA does not have a duty to defend the City in Flanigan's II, (d)
GIRMA can deny coverage for claims that arose in Flanigan's II because of the nuisance action,
and (e) the City is liable for costs incurred by GIRMA since February 1, 2013, the date GIRMA
issued the amended Notice of Reservation of Rights.
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"A motion to dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-12(b)(6) will not be sustained unless

(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled
to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant
establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought."

Facility Inv., LP v. Homeland Ins.

Co. of New York, 321 Ga. App. 103, 104 (2013). (quoting Northway v. Allen, 291 Ga. 227,229
(2012)).
The duty to defend is determined by the language of the insurance contact and the
allegations of the complaint against the insured.

See Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled

American Veterans, 268 Ga. 564, 565 (1997). Only where "the complaint sets forth true factual
allegations showing no coverage" will the insurer be excused from providing a defense. Id.
"[Tjhe duty to defend exists if the claim potentially comes within the policy. Where the claim is
one of potential coverage, doubt as to liability and insurer's duty to defend should be resolved in
favor of the insured." Id. (Citations omitted); see also BBL-McCarthy, LLC v. Baldwin Paving
Co., 285 Ga. App. 494, 497 (2007) (quoting City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
231 Ga. App. 206 (1998)) ("If the facts as alleged in the complaint even arguably bring the
occurrence within the policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the action,").
"[A]n insurer's duty to pay and its duty to defend are separate and independent
obligations." See Penn-Am. Ins. Co, v. Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc., 268 Ga. 564, 565 (1997)
(quoting Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Us. Fire Ins. Co., 180 Ga. App. 413, 416 (1986)).
Because GIRMA seeks a declaration related to both, they are discussed below in turn.
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I.

The Duty to Defend

It is undisputed that GIRMA defended and continues to defend the City in Flanigan's 1

and 11. It is also clear from the face of the Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief and Damages, the operable complaint in the underlying action, that money
damages have been sought. Therefore, under clear Georgia precedent, GIRMA has a duty to
defend the City. See Penn-America Ins. Co., 268 Ga. App. at 565.
GIRMA argues that the only Flanigan's 11 claim seeking money damages "arises out of'
or is "connected with" the City's nuisance suit because the claim was one for retaliation and
would not have been filed in the Second Amended Complaint "but for" the filing of the nuisance
action. GIRMA reasons that the claim for money damages should be excluded because it is
"arising out of' the nuisance suit brought by the City which sought only equitable relief. The
City disagrees, noting that the claims in Flanigan's 11 would be covered under the clear language
of the Coverage Agreement despite the exclusion because Flanigan's is seeking money damages
in its claims against the City. The City further argues that the nuisance action is not a "claim"
within the meaning of the exclusion. Expanding the definition of "claim" beyond the claims
brought in Flanigan's 11 to include the nuisance claims brought by the City against Flanigan's
would effectively allow GIRMA to withdraw its defense for an otherwise covered claim
whenever the insured asserted a nonmonetary claim against its opponents.

The Court finds

GIRMA's argument unavailing, and declines to interpret the exclusion so broadly.
The trial court is "obligated to strictly construe the language of the policy exclusion in
favor of the insured." See Hoover v. Maxum Indem. Co., 291 Ga. 402, 418 (2012).

Here, it is

unreasonable to construe this exclusion as GIRMA suggests, as it would exclude coverage
simply because the City exercised its legal rights in a separate action. As such, the Court holds
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that the claims brought against the City are arguably covered by the Coverage Agreement, and
GIRMA has a duty to defend the City in Flanigan's 11 under the plain language of the Coverage

Agreement. The Court hereby GRANTS the City's Motion to the extent that the Complaint
seeks a determination that GIRMA does not have a duty to defend.
II.

Coverage Under the Policy/Indemnification

Whether GIRMA will be ultimately liable to indemnify the City is a separate issue from
the duty to defend. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Ga. Athletic Assn'n, Inc., 288 Ga.
App. 355,364 (2007). It is not for this Court to decide whether the claim for money damages in
the underlying suit is meritorious or groundless. The underlying action is still pending and the
parties agree that certain rulings in that case will be appealed. Therefore, any determination as to
whether the policy covers the claims brought is premature and would be the result of an
impermissible advisory opinion. As such, the COUli hereby GRANTS the City's Motion to the
extent that the Complaint seeks a determination as to indemnification of coverage under the
policy, an impermissible advisory opinion.
III.

Reimbursement of Costs of Litigation

Finally, GIRMA argues that it is entitled to recover litigation costs incurred in the
Flanigan's 11 litigation since February 1, 2013.

GIRMA has not presented a contract provision

in the Coverage Agreement that creates a right to reimbursement for litigation costs spent since
the issuance of the Amended Reservation of Rights. GIRMA argues that even though the City
did not execute a copy of the Amended Reservation of Rights letter, it impliedly consented by
continuing to accept GIRMA's defense and by engaging in conversations regarding the defense
and GIRMA's chosen defense counsel (apparently the City had recommended this counsel, but
of course GIRMA had no duty to hire him). Even taking all of GIRMA's allegations concerning
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their discussions as true, as set forth in the First Amendment to Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment, GIRMA cannot get around the fact that there was no agreement between the patties as
evidenced by GIRMA's
February 1,2013
defend.

filing this Declaratory Judgment action as it had threatened in the

Reservation of Rights letter.

As noted above, GIRMA has an ongoing duty to

Finding no basis in law or contract for the reimbursement of litigation costs, the Court

hereby GRANTS the City's Motion to the extent that the Complaint seeks reimbursement of

defense costs in Flanigan's 1I.

SO ORDERED this

21

-so\--

-day of January, 2015.

The Honora Ie Elizabeth E. Long
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:

Jody M. Rhodes, Business Court Program Director & Staff Attorney

James R. Westbury, Jr.
Matthew H. Bennett
JAMES R. WESTBURY, JR., P.C.
1012 Memorial Drive
Suite 13
Griffin, GA 30224
Telephone: (678) 688-3554
Facsimile: (678) 688-3555
jrw@westburylaw.net
mbennett@westburylaw.net

Richard E. Dolder, Jr.
James ("Jay") Sadd
SLAPPEY & SADD
352 Sandy Springs Circle
Atlanta, GA 30328
Telephone: (404) 255-6677
Facsimile: (404) 255-7340
rich@lawyersatlanta.com
jay@lawyersatlanta.com
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